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FRENCH LEaDERS WOK AT IE UNITED NATIONS
The changing world arena of the past few years has touched
each of its participants more or less deeply. Among the nations of
the West, none has been more deeply transformed than France. Among
the international organizations that figure in world politics, none
has been more dramatically involved than the United Nations. That
French perspectives on the United Nations diould have changed during
this period seems a natural outcome of events, Some of these events,
such as Suez and Algeria, brought the French Republic and the United
Nations into direct conflict, These produced rapid alterations in
French views of the United Nations, although not always in the direc-
tion that seems most obvious. A more profound impact, it would seem,
has been registered by the transformation of France itself during
the past few years - independent of, but parallel to, the continuing
evolution of the United Nations as an international force.
The purpose of this paper is to identify the perspectives
which govern the opinions of French leaders toward the United Nations,
Having identified them, we shall seek to characterize the differences
between them in terms of their motivation, content, and outcome, It
will not do to say simply tnat "the French" are hostile to the Urited'
Nations because ibey are nationalists, While traditional nationalism
isgstill a powerful political emotion in France, it i expressed in
various ways among 'contemporary Frenchmen. The varieties of French
2nationalism today include -- and the paradox is more anoarent than
real -- commitments to internationalism and loyalties to suprana-
tionalism.
The principal forms of international action that have involved
French participation over the past decade are the European Community,
the atlantic Community, the United Nations. a prevailing Western
view, one might almost say the official view., is that these three
levels of collective action are mutually compatible and even recipro-
cally reinforcing. Nothing in theinstitutional design and functional
tasks of these communities excludes full participation in either of
the others. Indeed, excepting only Germany, the member nations of the
European Community also participate in the Atlantic Community and in
the United Nations.
Nevertheless, they represent quite distinct levels of collec-
tive action, operating through separate institutions to accomplish
separate (even if compatible) purposes. What has become clear, during
the past few years, is that they are also capable of arousing quite
distinct emotions and quite different loyalties. Ao comprehend the
full array of French attitudes towards the United Nations, it is in-
dispensable to collate and compare their attitudes towards the other
instruments of collective international action. Some of the more
dramatic alterations of French political attitudes have their locus here,
Our interest, then, is not to deliver any summary conclusion
that "the French" are against the United Nations because they are na-
tionalists or for the United Nations because they are international.stzi
Our concern is, rather, to differentiate the nuances of French opinion
along a continuum of international attitudes whihA rns froi total
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hostility to total advocacy toward the United Nations. Both extremes,
pro and con, are represented among current French leaders. The more
numerous, realistic and ultimately, we believe, the most important atti-
tudes lie between these extremes.
This conclusion emerged from a continuing survey of attitudes
towards collective international action among the French elite. Our
survey began in September 1954, a fortnight after the defeat of EDC,
and was repeated annually until the spring of 1956. In the course of
this survey, some 2000 leading Frenchmen were interviewed on a full
array of issues concerning France's position in the international
arena, including the United Nations. Our panel of respondents included
leading figures in seven principal sectors of French public life
government and politics; business and labor; the military; the church,
and the secular intelligentsia. This was not a contact poll of public
opinion, but a prolonged attitude survey among the French elite. We
were concerned to determine how this well-informed panel of policy-
advisers and decision-makers perceived the world political arena, and
evaluated the place of France in that arena,
Our inquiry was focused on the issues of collective interna.
tional action. Given the depressed condition of Europe in the imme-
diate postwar decade, and given the slowly spreading recognition that
world power was no longer lodged in the European continent, how were
the European leaders perceiving the problems of collective action at
the start of the second postwar decade? Our survey posed the same set
of questions simultaneously to comparable nanels of leaders in Frane
Britain and Germany. We were thus in a position to compare the li
attitudeo in all three countries during each year § o m s i
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also to compare the evolution of such attitudes in all three countries
during the years 1954-56. We have already reported the comparative
evolution of European attitudes toward problems of economic growth
and military security. In this paper we focus on French attitudes
toward the issues of collective international organization with
special attention to the United Nations.
One finding of our 1954-56 survey was that French attitudes
dift fered rather sharply from the others. The quality that differen-
tiated French from other European attitudes toward the United Nations
was its cool indifference, The phrase cool indifference is used as
an empirical description of our survey result. Coolness was manifested
by the tendency to make relatively unfavorable rather than favorable
judgments on the performance and prospects of the United Nations,
Indifference was manifested by the relatively low intensity of such
unfavorable judgment (and by the relatively low inclination to express
oneself at all on questions concerning the United Nations).
While this finding may appear to be no news for observers con-
vinced that the French are systematically hostile to the United Nations
nevertheless it shows certain features that are not easily compatible
with the hypothesis of systematic hostility. Considered as a continu,
umr of attitudes., coolness does lead at one extreme to explicit hostilit;
and indifference does lead at another extreme to explicit con temApt
But the plain fact of our survey is thait relatively few re14podents
oui 1rench panel expressed either overt hostility a eroliit cn e
L See D. Lerner and N. Gorden, "Eurovom4 cia-n '0o W
e i (CENIS Document, C 6 7
5These extreme attitudes were found to exist only among marginal sec-
tors of the French elite. There was no evidence to show that these
extreme attitudes are more widely distributed, or more centrally
located, among the elite in France than elsewhere.
What was distinctive among the French elite was the characteristic
tonality of attitude toward the United Nations - i.e., the relatively
negative valence of Judgment integrated with the .telatively low inten-
sity of interest. In many countries the general level of detailed
information about the United Nations is low, even among the elite of
the nation. But, in other countries, ignorance is typically coupled
with a dominant attitude of warm interest and sympathetic approval.
People may not know very much about the structure and functioning of
the United Nations, but they tend to approve of its existence and
hope that "some good" will come of its activities. In France, on
the contrary, the modal quality of response was cool indifference.
among those who neither know nor care about the United Nations, this
attitude tended toward absolute hostility or contempt. among those
French respondents who did know or care in some measure, the prevail-
ing indifference was rather more qualified by their greater interest
in other issues of international cooeration (as comnared with the ad-
vocacy of United Nations manifested by the elites of Britain and
Germany).
The profile of French attitudes toward the United Nations was
more complex and nuanced than we had expected, analysis of our
1954-56 materials showed that a just appreciation of these responses
would have to set them in the full context of French perceptions of
6the world political arena. Moreover, it was clear that the shifting
scene of international politics would be likely to produce greater
changes in French attitudes toward the United Nations than in the
more stable and generally favorable attitudes of the British and German
elites, While this analysis was in process, during the years of
1957-58, two dramatic events directly involving France with the United
Nations in fact occurred - Suez and Algeria. Accordingly, in the
soring of 1959, we returned to Europe and made a fresh survey of atti-
tudes toward the United Nations. Our interest was to determine which
attitudes had remained constant, which attitudes had changed and in
what ways. The present paper reports on the stable and shifting ele-
ments, as between 1956 and 1959, in the attitudes of French leaders
toward the United Nations. We begin with a summary of the picture
that emerged from our 1956 survey,
The Situation in 1956
In the course of our 1956 survey, we asle d the French panel:
"Do you think the United Nations will play an important role in the
future?" This vague and diffuse question was designed to differentiate
the Prench panel in terms of their general orientation, qtite inde-
pendent of specific motivations or judgments. The panel in fact divided
quite neatly on this question: 8% said yes, 43% said no, and 9% did
Tnot respond. This sharp division was chtri of the Fvnr
ranel; in the other countries a considerably r eiyr oret e-
spondents said yes, French "cool indiffe-rence" 4a e essed is
Kton to believe in the~ Unltted
4-f Liic.ve irit & A,
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orientation manifests hardly anything more than a tone of voice, it
made a good starting point for our inquiry.
Accordingly, we sought to establish some defining characteristics
of the two groups -- were the yea-sayers (pro-UN), as compared with
the nay-sayers (anti-UN) older or younger, more or less educated,
better or worse informed? If the two groups could be differentiated
by such overt biographical characteristics, then we might be able to
explain their different orientation in terms of their life history.
Such differences between the two groups turned out, in fact, to be
too small to provide any convincing explanation. The marginal diffe-
rences that appeared, however, were fairly suggestive. Since each
group contained about a hundred respondents (99 yeamsayers and 89 nay-
sayers), we considered that differences exceeding five percent on
such biographical characteristics were noteworthy,
Thus, while the age variation between the two groups was con-
sistently small, we note that the nay-sayers are more centrally
located in the age group of 50-60. The yea-sayers disperse somewhat
more among both older and younger groups. There was no noteworthy
variation in level of education, since the whole elite panel is a
highly educated group. The variations in education which exist are
more clearly reflected in the occupational differences between the
two groups. The yea-sayers are more heavily concentrated in politics
and the universities; the nay-sayers are more heavily recruited from
the higher civil service, journalism, and the professions,
An interesting variation appeared in the responses dealing with
public information. Our panel as a whole is clearly a well-informed.
segment of the French population. The majority;%r blVee 'hy b
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adequate information to evaluate international events, while only
one out of three respondents considers the information available to
him as insufficient. They are highly exposed to all channels of in-
formation, including the press and the oeriodicals, the mass media,
travel, and personal contacts. Variation occurred when respondents
were asked to rank the various sources of information in order of im-
portance. Here the nay-sayers quite substantially consider that
"personal contact" is their most important source of information (35%
as compared with 22% of the yea-sayers). This may reflect the occu-
pational concern of journalists with "inside dope" from personal
sources, Alternatively, it may reflect a somewhat larger skepticism
about public information among the nay-sayers.
There is some collateral evidence to indicate that the nay-
sayers are, on the whole, a more skeptical and "hard-headed" group
than the yea-sayers. One such indication is the typical distribution
of responses across the full array of questions posed in our interview.
Typically, the yea-sayers tend to be more uncertain; more of them con-
sistently "don't know" or "can't decide" how to answer our questions.
Among those who do respond, however, the yea-sayers rather consistently
give an affirmative response to questions, where the nay-sayers tend
to give a negative response (regardless of the content of the question)
There is a substantial literature in psychological journals which sug-
gests that "yea-saying" and "nay-saying" in the interview situation is
often an expression of more profound personality differences between
respondents. 2
2. arthur Couch and Kenneth Keniston, "Yeasayers and y
riesponse Set as a Personality Vaiabe" oual r
SoalPschology, VN6,Mc,1 o,, 2
I' * *
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We can illustrate the point, in the present instance, by
reference to responses to four quite diverse topics. One set of
questions dealt with the role of public opinion in politics. When
asked whether public opinion should have more influence on political
decisions, 49% naysayers said no as compared with 40% yea-sayers.
When asked specifically whether public ooinion should have more influ
ene on foreign policy, the difference between the two groups became
even wider: 55% nay-sayers as compared with 42% yea-sayers.
another set of questions dealt with the role of science in so-
ciety. When asked whether science can change man, only 52% nay-sayers
believed that it could, whereas 59% yea-sayers did so. When asked
more specifically whether science was capable of improving political
life (determining policy in a more rational way), the nay-sayers were
clearly more skeptical. Whereas 3%yea-sayers believed science could
improve policy, only 42% of the nay-sayers said definitely no.,
An especially interesting demonstration of skepticism came in
the response to our question: "Do you believe that the world is evolving
in a determined direction?" While the specific form, of determinism
that might occur tomost Frenchmen in the spring of 1956 was Marxism,
oura question designed to differentiate all sorts of determinists from
the skeptics. It is noteworthy that only 17% of the yea-sayers were
skeptical of all determinism as compared with 29% of the nay-sayers.
The foregoing indicates that nayiayers - those wh l re e
tical about the future importance of th nited Natin -als
mnore skeptical and "hard-headed" about many othe r- g tins
std Aes, we have seen that "hd-hededess can Ae Cn Q'cort.:.
.entiating factor among
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in committing onseself to risky new enterprises, to preferring a skep-
tical no over an optimistic yes, is fairly well established among the
French elite. 3
Accordingly, it is worth noting where the hard-headed skeptics
deviate from their accustomed pattern of negativism on new and strange
propositions involving international collaboration. One set of
questions began by asking respondents whether they would approve the
integration of French armed forces into an international army. We
then asked whether respondents considered it preferable for France
to produce its armaments entirely at home or in an international arzma
mnts pool, On both these questions, a majority of all respondents
favored the international solution, but the nay-sayers gave conspi-
cuously more anproval than the yea-sayers. This, paradoxically, aug,
gested that those Frenchmen cool to the UN were more warmly "inter.
nationalist". A more plausible hypothesis seemed to be that the nay-
sayers were more concerned with security matters. The final question
in the set appeared to corroborate this. When asked: "Should France
manufacture thermo-nuclear weapons?", the nay-sayers again gave con
spicuously more approval to this activity than the yea-sayers. The
prorortions saying yes on all three of the foregoing questions are
shown in Table 1:
Table 1: UN Orientation and Security issues
approve International &rmy 59%
approve armament Pbol 57
approve Nuclear Weapons 516
)~ U.id~Headed ~
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Rather consistently, then, those French respondents who took
a dim view of UN prospects showed a greater concern with security
issues. Substantially more of them approved extreme measures designed
to advance the French security posture, such as the manufacture of
nuclear weapons. Substantially more of them anproved every proposal
for collective internationalaction in the arena of security
including an international army (widely identified with U1N in 1956)
That the diffidence and skepticism of the nay-sayers should break
down at this point, that the issues of security should evoke so strong
an "internationalist" response among them, provided the key needed
to unlock the puzsle. Further analysis of our data indicated that
the nay-sayers were a different breed of "internationalists" from
the yea-sayers. They strongly advocated other forms of international
action while remaining cooly indifferent to the United Nations, be-
cause they had a quite different image of the world political arena.
These contrasting images emerged in response to a set of questions
concerning the present shape and future prospects of world politics,
We asked: "Do you think that your generation will see a third world
war?" Fewer nay-sayers were prepared to be optimistic on this question:
Only 45% said no, as compared with 52% of the yea-sayers, Yore of
them were orepared to say that they definitely did expect a third world
war within their own lifetime. The qualitative difference in these'
resnonses is more profound than the quantitative differ-ence., The ex-
oectation of war is perhaps the most fundarental element in a rxrcnu
political perspective. A man who believes that a wair will haapn
within his own lifetime is likely to make diffeeat choices, awrd
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different priorities, stress different issues than a person who ex.
pects peace.
The contrast in political perspectives between the two groups
was further extended when we asked whether the shape of world politics
was more aptly characterized as coexistence or cold war. The yea-
sayers were significantly more inclined to say coexistence: 38% as
compared with 25%. The nay-sayers were significantly more inclined to
describe the structure of international politics as cold war: 28%
as compared with 17%. It is worth recalling, in this connection, that
the nay-sayers had expressed much greater skepticism when asked whether
the world was developing in a determined direction. Yet, while skepti-
cal of determinism in general, the nay-sayers clearly were more ready
to foresee the determined evolution of world politics as continuing
cold war erupting into hot war within their own lifetime.
Their darker perspective on the political future probably ac.
counts for their greater concern with the issues of security. It sug-
gests also the particular sense in which they are more "internationalist"
than those French yea-sayers who support the UN, but do not foresee
a continuing cold war or an erupting hot war, and are therefore less
intensely concerned with armies and armaments.
The "internationalism" of the naysayers turned out to be quite
definitely a ,reference for colle ctive action among the European
nations. On every question which gave respondents a choice between
various forms of international cooperation, the non-UN people con-
sistently preferred the European Community and its institutionis over
all other forms. One question asked directly which Iform of intefrn
ional conneration they considered pr*eferaib Ie fo z
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resoondents a choice between European, Atlantic, United Nations,, Pree!,
World, and world institutions. The nay-sayers strongly preferred
Euronean institutions, as manifested both in the Europe of Six (Coal-
Steel Community) and the Europe of Fifteen (QEEC). These European
institutions together received a oreference of 44% may-sayers as com-
Dared with 36%. yea-sayers.
Not only do the nay-sayers prefer the European form of collec-
tive action, but, despite their accustomed skepticismthey are con-
siderably more optimistic that these institutions will be successful.
When asked to identify the most influential countries in the world
balance of power, the responses of the two groups were virtually
identical on all points except one. About one third in each group
named the United States and another third named the 1.SS.Rt. Other
countries (e.g., China, India) were naimed by snall identical reac-
tions in both groups, the important difference being in respect to
Europe. Whereas only 19% of the yea-sayers ranked Europe as "most
influential" in the present balance of world power, 28% of the nay-
sayers did so - nearly as many as gave the calm to either the J.3S
or the U.S.S.R. When asked what changes they foresaw in the future
balarice of world power, -the nay-sayers again expressed greater confl
dence in the increasing influence of Lurope
The greater confidence in the present nd future  of Eur
exprassed by the nay-sayers showed itselfI in interestin vr
bet-ween the two groups concerning the role of indivi on es
e nay-sayers were considerably more cnrfident 0not tn e f
ini V~&k This nay explain why, as we a gea-rlie te *asayers
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expressed a much greater interest in "getting aloig" with the British
despite their general diffidence about foreigners as comoared with
the more diffuse xenophilia of the yea-sayers. Similarly, in fore-
casting a role of increasing influence for Europe in the world balance
of power, the nay-sayers were much more inclined than the yea-sayers
(over 2 to 1) to forecast a significant rise in German power. This
anpeared to be associated with the greater determination of the nay-
sayers to count on strong Franco-German cooperqtion as the basis for
collective international action in the future, For example, when
asked whether they foresaw any obstacles to Franco-German under-
standings, the yea-sayers were much more inclined to foresee obstacles
(76% as compared with 61%) and to specify these obstacles, usually
in terms of the historic antagonism between the two countries. The
nay-sayers, on the other hand, were much more inclined to state ex-
plicitly that there would be "no obstacles"., 31% of them exoressing
this optimistic view as compared with 14% of the yea-sayers.
This sequence of findings puts us in a better position to under-
stand the differences between the two groups, particularly the form
which "internationalism" has taken among those French respondenta who
are skeptical about the future of the United Nations. In summarizing
these results, it is important to bear in mind that the quantitative
differences between the two groups are relatively small. This indi-
cates that on many issues Frenchmen tend to agree, regardless of their
orientation toward the United Nations. What is striking about these
differences is their qualitative significance -- 14e., their c ist
of direction and the intensity of the attitudes involved.2 Thu 4
is a hij level of "internationalist" sentiment among the re
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as a whole -- not a systematic hostility based on traditional nationalism
as is usually supposed.
But this sentiment attaches itself to two quite divergent lines
of policy thinking. For those Frenchmen who pin their confidence
on the United Nations, the meanings traditionally associated with
"internationalism" still retain their validity. These respondents
are more optimistic about the future of the world. They foresee no
third world war, and they foresee the shading of cold war into peace
ful coexistence. They are less concerned with security issues, hence
they are less ready to advocate the manufacture of nuclear weapons,
the internationalization of French armaments in a pool, the interna-
tionalisation of the French armed forces. This perspective makes a
critical difference in the priorities they assign to the policy choi.ce
that face Frenchmen in the field of international cooperation. The
yea-sayers are more concerned with, and more substantially favorable
to, the United Nations and its institutions than to any other form of
international cooperation.
The nay-sayers are led into quite a different sequence of po-
licy preferences. We recall that bhey are not hostile to the United
Nations. The question which differentiatea them from the yea-sayerk
was whether they thought the United Nations would play ari important
role in the future, The nay-sayers said no; but the apparent inference
frcm this judgment that the nay-sayers were anti internationalists
turned out to be false. Without being hostile to the UN, the nay-,
sayers are less concerned with it because they are less confident
that it can solve those problems which they consider most important.
These are the problems of collective security. Cn h rge
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the nay-sayers are neither xenophobic nor nationalistic. Indeed, on
precisely these issues they are more "internationalist" than the yea-
sayers. They are more convinced that these are the crucial issues
which require hard-headed imagination, invention, internationalism.
The quality of hard-headedness concerns us here not as a virtue
or defect of. the French character, but rather as a habit of mind which
differentiates the thinking on current issues of Frenchmen who, in
other respects, think alike. If the nay-sayers aopear to be more
hard-headed, this does not imply that the yea-sayers are soft-headed,
A skeptical habit of mind is ingrained in most Frenchmenand the
smallness of ~the differences between the two grogps, which represent
only two general orientations toward the future imoortance of the
United Nations, may reflect only a difference of attitude toward
questions of international politics rather than a more general dis-
position. The two groups tend to pick different things to be hard-
headed about.
For example, at first glance, the yea-sayers appear to be
generally better disposed toward foreigners. More of them consider
that contact with foreigners is "very useful" as a source of informa-
tion on international problems. Conversely, more of the nay-sayers
consider such foreign contact to be of "little use",, and more of the
read foreign books.
an interesting clue to these differences. came when we asked
respondents with which foreigners they had the best Punderstanding"
In response, one third of the yea-sayers (twice as nany as the nay
sayers) refused to choose among foreignersi; a sub t r
en did a diect choice by saying tha t they ik n
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she nay-sayers, generally less reticent about making definite choices
and explicit commitments, were much clearer on their preferences,
They gave a substantial vote to the British and the Latins, while on
most other nationalities the two groups were roughly similar. (We
note with interest, in passing, that the Germans rated first on the
yea-sayers list with 15%, second on the nay-sayers list with 13%).
This suggests to us that the nay-sayers are not significantly more
xenonhobic than the yea-sayers, but they are somewhat more "hard-
headed" about foreigners in the sense that they select their contacts
more deliberately. This may explain why the nay-sayers, while they
consider personal contact at home to be far more useful than such con~
tacts abroad, nevertheless tend to listen. more to foreign radio than
the yea-sayers.
We do not dare to push this sugrestive line of inquiry too
far, for cur data on the biographical characteristics and intellec-
tual style of the French panel are too limited to permit a really
systematic differentiation between optimists and pessimists with
respect to the future of the United Nations,. Indeed, we might have
omitted this aspect of our findings altogether did it not seem to be
connected with the modre significant differences that turnetd up when
we compared the two groups of French respondets with respect to
overt political and ideological issuese These difference. s5eged
when we investigated the specific meaning of tera roalim
From Internationalism to aole io n
To comprehend the dramatic raso in
i '?otrjrr i9rtnch
from the conventional meanings assigned to this term by Americans.
Internationalism wmans for us, as it has until recently ror most
people, advocacy of active good will and effective cooperation among
nations. Since 1945,, however, internationalism has increasingly been
identified among us with the particular institution of the United
Nations. It has become axiomatic that an internationalist supports
the United Nations; a person who does not support the United Nations
is not an internationalist. There has been no reason to question
this identification because none other of our commitments to inter-
national cooperation -- e.g., the Organization of American States, or
our various regional alliances with NaTO, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS -- has
come into conflict with our allegiance to the United Nations.
Internationalism has taken. a different turn in France during
the past few years. A substantial number of French leaders have per.
ceived a conflict of interest -- or at least a conflict of political
priorities -- between the United Nations and other forms of interna-
tional cooperation which they consider more important for France.
The particular focus of this issue is the European Community.
It seems likely that the current commitment of Frenchmen to
the European Community is not precisely identical with our conventional
understanding of internationalism. The genuine internationalist
favors cooperation among nations for the mutual benefit of all parti,-
cipants. It is part of his commitment, usually implicit but neverthe-
less well understood, that the arena of international cooperation
should be as wide as possible - i.e., that any nation willing to ab
by certain minimal rules of cooperation should be admitted to th i
rative community, It is also implicit in the in7ternati n
nun article of faith, : t co m.
gradually dissolve the petty play of nationalist interesto within
the larger focus of the common good of a world community.
Internationalism has taken on a different valence among a
substantial segment of the contemporary French elite,. The idea of a
European Community has animated a drive towards collective interna-
tional action which diverges from some of the basic attitudinal com-
miitments traditionally associated with internationalism. Its goal
is not an ever-enlarging world community, but a small (and perhaps
narrowing) continental community. It seeks not the common good of
all nations, bbt the commn good of those nations directly partici-
oating in the European Community. Its motivation is not to dissolve
national interests, but to increase the power of the European nations
to maintain their interests. For many Frenchmen, it seems fair to
say, the European Community is a way of restoring the French nation
to its former greatness, 'his involves international cooperation,
but with a different sequence of ends and means, of perspectives and
procedures. It is internationalism harnessed directly to the national
welfare.
In sketching the new version of internationalism found among
the French elite so sharply, we have run ahead of our story, The
reader will pronerly ask on what basis wfe have reached these concli-
sions. With the reminder that these are not firm conclusions but
interPretations suggested by our 1956 survey that we were to recheck
in 1959, we can indicate the data underlymig this anairsis Te trail
of our hypothesis began when we asked our 207 Frn 'resp on dents
"Do you think that France can decifde her future on hI Cw, or -iest
;-h cope rate with other nations?"'The cl. p nrnc :
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was that the national capability of France was not sufficient to de-
cide her future, that France must cooperate with other nations.
However, when we compared the responses given by yea-sayers
and nay-sayers to the United Nations, a rather surprising result
emerged. Fewer "internationalists" were convinced of the necessity
for international cooperationi Whereas 72% of the yea-sayers said
international cooperation was indispensable, 82% of the nay-sayesi-
said this. How, the question arose, was it possible for "internationa-
lists" to be less committed to the need for international cooperation
than others? a suspicion that interpreting this result in terms of
conventional "internationalism" would put us on the wrong track arose
when we noticed the response to the next question. "Do you think
that France can avoid a choice between the two camps (East and West)?"
We had to put this question next in our interview schedule on the
view that those who believed that international cooperation was indis-
pensable would, by the political logic of 1956, be less committed to
the idea of a neutralist position between the East and West camps and
therefore more committed to the idea of the Western alliance as a form
of international cooperation. This expectation was utterly confounded,
as was the parallel expectation that those more convinced that France
needed international cooperation would a fortiori be more committed to
the United Nations. The response, indeed, was precisely. the reverse of
what we had expected. The yea-sayers, who supported the BN and believied
in its future, considerably outnumbered the nay-sayers (32 to 19) in
responding that France could avoid a choice between the two camp s
Conversely, the nay-sayers were considerably more definite in a
(h8 to 36) that France could, not avoid a choicte betn th w
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These results appeared to be either meaningless (with respect
to the intent of our questions) or else paradoxical. For, if they
meant anything, it was that the official "internationalists" (UN sup-
porters) were in some sense less internationalist than those mho
took a dim view of the UN. To see whether our questions were irrele-
vant or our a priori expectations erroneous, we ransacked ouz inter-
views and our statistical tabulations for additional enlightenment,
The set of questions dealing with military matters provided the clue
needed to qualify our interpretation of "the new internationalism" in
meaningful fashion,
For it was on just this range of issues and only on issues
relatAd to security - that the nay-sayers consistently proved to be
stronger advocates of collective international action. We have seen
that the nay-sayers are more inclined to foresee a world arena in
which continuing cold war will erupt into hot war within their own
lifetime. The expectation of World War III shapes their persnective
on most issues of current policy, It explains why the nay-sayers
give greater priority, in the scheme of France s international rela-
tions, to the need for a strong system of collective security.
Thereby hangs the tale of "the new internationalism". For the
nay-sayers believe the European Community to be a more effective ba- :
for collective security than the United Nations' This variation i
their judgment entails, moreover, a systemnatic divergence On manyi
policy issues. In particular, they diverge from the attituder
tionally associated with the term "internationaliim". They art
concerned with internationalism as the way to a peacelflul d '
nity; they are more concerned with collctive actico,
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of a strong European community. This transitiott from "internationalism"
to "collective action" underlies their thinking about the full range
of European and world issues. The difference between the two groups,
which we have already seen in their divergent views of international
cooeration, emerged even more clearly from a set of questions dealing
exlicitly with the European Community.
PP ORITY OF EUROPEAN COMIMUNITY
We began by asking the respondents to state whether they were,
in general, "for" or "against" the European idea. Only a tiny frac-
tion of all respondents declared theiselves "against", However, a
1gndficantly larger proportion of nay-sayers declared themselves
Okfor" the European Community without reservations 77% as compared
wiu 56% yea-sayers. The latter, who assign the UN top priority in
international cooperation, were much more inclined to qualify their
aptoval. Over twice as many ye -sayers declared themselves "for
Europe, but with reservations".
Unfortunately, we did not ask respondents to saecify the sub-
etA_:ce of their "reservations", (an oversight we corrected three years
in the 1959 survey). But :n 1956 it wae areay clear that for
French leaders an inverse relitionshir existed tween the Jned
Jon and the European Comunity ii term-as of polcy priority,
I-er rnern with the Europebr Co6-:~ 1y 6& er conce~rn
K;the~ i~tedi Nations, an r~vs~ iii 3V rtorsh
~~~~eii point f Jt ir u ldr'
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Germany. This point of tension seemed to grow directly out of speci-
fically French concerns and perspectives of that period.
Another point of special interest in the French data was the
direct relationship exhibited between general approval of the European
Community and intensity of commitment, That is, the more one aproved
of the European idea the more one was willing to endorse extreme com-
mitments (i.e., sacrifices of national sovereignty) to insure the
efficient functioning of its institutions. as compared with their
cool indifference to UN,;the nay-sayers exhibited warm advocacy of
Europe. This is shown by a question that asked: "What form should
the European idea take?" Choices were arranged in increasing order
of supranational commitments that would diminish national sovereignty:
reciprocal alliance, confederation, federal state. The yea-sayers
tended to prefer the less commd.ttal form of a reciprocal alliance;
the nay-sayers tended to prefer the most supranational form: 35% nay-
sayers opted for a federal state as compared with 30% yea-sayers.
This relationship was confirmed, and even extended, when re-
spondents were asked to express aoproval or disaprroval of the existing
Eurooean organizations. The nay-sayers gave significantly more arproval
to the more binding forms of supranational organization, particularly
those concerned with military and economic cooperation. The yea-saye
tended to approve more highly of the looser organizations with more
diffuse political purposes. The distribution of approval between
the two groups is shown in Table 2:
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Table 2. Approval of European Organizations
Na-Saera Yea-Sayera
Coal-Steel Community 82% 70%
NATO 80 64
OEEC 79 69
Council of Europe 61 64
Paris Migreements (WEU) 46 52
There are several points of interest in these figures. The
differences are greatest with respect to the Coal-Steel Community
and NATO. These were, respectively, the "tightest" institutions of
international cooperation in the military and economic fields extant
in 1956. To these institutions the nay-sayers gave their greatest
approval; the yea-sayers, while certainly not hostile, were much less
enthusiastic. Even the OEE1C, which had produced its "binding" effect
by utility rather than legality, was less highly favored by the yea-
sayers. Only the two loosest, least focused, and probably least ef-
fective of the European organizations drew more approval from the
yea-sayers than t he nay-sayers. It is noteworthy that the yea-sayers
gave just as much approval to the Council of Europe as to NATO This
probably reflects their greater concern with political rather than
military issues, and possibly indicates their "rsservations%.about
the European idea. The nay-sayers, on the contrary, approve the
mos.t tightly knit organizations concerned ltb mitay and economic
issues, and shcu relatively less conscern with loosr istiutions
faild toai uster oity o
failed to muster a majority of approval among the may-layerb
25
This is a particularly interesting result, in the context of
1956, and merits some explanation. The Paris Agreements, which
created the West European Union (WEU), were essentially a device de-
signed to secure the admission of Germany into NATO. They were
regarded as a consolation prize after the defeat of the European
Defense Community (EDC). Under the EDC, a fully integrated European
army had been designed to incoroorate both French and German along
with the other continental armed forces under a supranational command.
The defeat of EDC by the French National assembly appeared calamitous
to the pro-Europeans. The alternative solution of WEU, which was
hastily rushed through the National assembly in a dramatic New Year s
Eve session, was regarded by strong "Europeans" less as a consolation
than as certifying the end of their hopes for a genuinely integrated
European Defense Community.
On this basis, one might expect the lukewarm attitude toward
WEU expressed by the nay-sayers in 1956 to signify mainly that they
would have preferred EDC. And so, indeed, it turns out. When we
asked respondents whether they had favored EDC, 56% nay-sayers said
yes as compared with 46% yea-sayers, Here, again, the tighter form of
supranational organization for collective security was approved by
significantly more nay-sayers.
A similar tendency appeared with respect to collective economic
action. Respondents were asked whether they believed the extension of
the European Coal-Steel Community (ECSC) to other fields was feasible..
This was a point of earnest French debate in 1956. While the ECSC pr i. n
ciple was widely approv'ed, the debate hinged upon its feasibility,
Skepticism was widespread, Yet, despite their usually greater
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skepticism on other issues, fewer nay-sayers (11% as compared with
16% yea-sayers) were willing to express doubt thatthe extension of
ECSC was feasible. Since such extension subsequently occurred
through the Common Market, it is worth looking more closely at those
Frenchmen who, in 1956, preferred European Community to United Nations.
The issue was formulated, at the time, as supranationalism.
Supranationalism Versus Internationalism
To obtain a clearer view of the presumed conflict of loyalties
between United Nations and European Community -- the conflict, so to
speak, between internationalism and supranationalism -- we constructed
a matrix which showed the joint distribution of responses to both
institutions. In order to do this, we were obliged to omit the 27 re-
spondents who failed to give a clear answer on either. The remaining
180 respondents were classified into pro-UN(+) and anti-UN(-) groups.
We then tallied the number of persons in each group who approved (+)
approved with reservations (0), or opposed (-) the European idea.
The result is shown in Table 3:










Several interesting features of French thinking on international
issues are here expressed in numerical form. Clearly, attitude toward
Europe is the dominant feature, and attitude toward United Nations the
recessive feature, of this simultaneous distribution. There is virtu-
ally no opposition to the European idea among the French elite, re-
gardless of their orientation toward the United Nations. While there
is a substantial amount of negativism ("cool indifference") to the
United Nations, this is very largely confined to the pro-Europeans.
Those who are less firmly committed to Europe ("pro- with reservations")
tend to be considerably less negative and more favorable to the
United Nations. These points become clearer when we arrange the
groups in order of decreasing size, as in Table 4.
Table 4. The u!rope-UN Subgroups
GroEurope UN
A (D) 68
B (A) 55 +




Group A thus contains the 68 respondents who are pro-Europe but
anti-UN; group B contains the 55 respondents who are pro-Europe and
pro-UN; etc. Since groups I and I are too small to permit statisti-
cal analysis (reflecting the virtual absence of hostility to the
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European idea among the French elite), we shall drop them from con-
sideration and confine our attention to the four top groups.
Our first concern is to compare groups A and B. Among those
mho are pro-European, what differences occur as between the pro-UN
and anti-UN subgroups? As our earlier analysis had suggested that
differences between these groups followed from their divergent images
of the political future, we looked first at this range of issues.
Group A, those who oppose the TIN, are less confident than group B
(who support both institutions) that there will be no third world
war, that the trend of international politics is toward peaceful
coexistence. Indeed, they are the least optimistic of all four
groups on these issues and the most convinced (by nearly 2 to 1) that
continuing cold war will shape the political future
It is consistent with this darker view of the future, there-
fore, that group A should be more intensely concerned with security
issues and give more substantial support to military measures de-
signed to strengthen France's security position. The differences
are clear on three security issues that were highly controversial in
1956 -- i.e., French comitment to NaTO, French manufacture of atomic
weapons, French participation in a European armament pool, The pro-
portions of groups A and B expressing unqualified approval on each
of these issues are compared in Table 5
Table 5. sepcty Measures
Atomic Arm
NTO Weapons lbo
Group A 87% 64% 77%
Group B 69 46 65
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This does not sean that the pro-UN group B is indifferent to secu-
rity problems or to international cooperation in this field. For
example, group B gives slightly more support to the idea of an in-
ternational army (which was usually associated with the United Nations
in the discussions of 1956). It does man teat the group B people
are lerba convinced that security issues should take top priority in
French policy thinking.
The situation is rather similar in the field of economic ac-
tivity. The two main models of economic cooperation available in
1956 were the Coal-Steel Community (Europe of Six) and the 0EEC (Big
Europe). As the more tightly knit institution, with some features of
supranational control, the Coal-Steel Comunity (ECSC) was preferred
by strong advocates of European collective action. A controversial
question of the day was whether the ECSC model could be extended into
other fields (along the Lines of what has subsequently become the
European Common Market). On all three of these questions, as shown
in Table 6, group a expressed significantly higher approval than group B:
Table 6. Approval of Economic Measures
ECSC
ECSC OESC Extension
Group A 87 86 81
Group B 78 75 76
The greater concern of group A with collective action among the
European economies derives from their rather different image of the
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economic future. This appeared when respondents were asked whether
a rising standard of living could be maintained in France, and in
the rest of the world? Table 7 shows the proportion in each group
who believed that a rising standard could be maintained:
Table 7. Rsing Economical Levels
In In
France World
Group A 82% 75%
Group B 71 80
While both groups of European supporters are optimistic in general,
there is a clear divergence in their imagery of the economic future.
The pro-UN subgroup B is considerably more optimistic about the rest
of the world than it is about France; the anti-UN subgroup A re-
verses this expectation. This is consistent with group A's greater
doncern with collective economic action in the Europe of Six.
These differences of expectation appear to account for the
divergence on policy priorities. It explains why the anti-UN subgroup A
is more negative (25%) toward such organisations as the Council of
Europe than the pro-UN subgroup B (15%). Group A is less receptive
to anything that smacks of parliamentary discussion of international
cooperation and much more intensely concerned with international in-
stitutions for collective action. Since such institutions have been
more directly associated with the supranational organs of the European
Community, their interest is focused on this direction. This appears
to be the critical point in differentiating the internationalists
from the supranationalists among the French elite,
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Nationalism Versus Internationalism
While groups A and B clearly diverge on the issue of suprana-
tionalism, it is also obvious thatihey have much in common. Indeed,
when compared with groups C and D, they are more alike than different.
Groups C and D, in turn, differ from each other on many issues much
less than they differ from the two preceding groups. This suggests
that intensity of comitment to the European Comunity remains a cri-
tical factor differentiating the f ull spectrum of political attitudes
among the French elite.
This line of cleavage emerged rather consistently in all questions
which offered respondents a choice among various levels of interna-
tional cooperation ranging from the traditional forms of alliance to
much tighter institutions with supranational elements. In the question
dealing with foreign policy cooperation, for example, the most supra-
national option was a "federal state".- Similarly the most suprana-
tional form of military cooperation was EDC. Other such issues con-
cern the integration of the French armed forces into an international
army, the integration of French armments into an arms pool. On all
these questions groups A and B were closer to each other and more
distant from groups C and D. The distribution of the four groups on
all the foregoing questions is shown on Table 8
Table 8. Internationalism versus Nationalism
Common Federal EDC International Arms Atomic
Council State Army Pool Pool
Group A 31% i% 62% 71% 77% 40%
GroupB 154 65 74 65 36
Group C 12 18 30 47 59 24
Group D 19 6 44 44 25 19
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It is striking that, in wary case, the differences between Groups
C and ') are smaller than between these two groups and the top two
groups. 'Those who give unqualified approval to the European Com-
munity have wore in common, despite their differences about the
United Nations, than those who approve the European Community only
"with reservations". Were the issue of supranationalism was ex-
plicitly involved, as in EDD and the federal state, the differences
are quite sharp. The pattern of divergence persists, however, even
when the issues are less clearly supranationalist and more explicitly
internationalist - as in the international army and the arms-atoms
pools. It seems fair to draw the line of cleavage with groups A and
B together as "internationalist" as contrasted with groups C and D
labeled "nationalist".
There are some interesting variations between groups C and D,
which are clearly associated with their acceptance of rejectance of
the United Nations. For example, the pro-UN subgroup C gives some-
what greater support to an international army (connected in 1956
public discussion with the UN) but gives considerably less support
than group D to EDC, Similarly, again, they give greater support
to a pool of conventional armaments (again associated with the UN in
oublic discussion) than to an atomic pool, which has always been
discussed as a purely continental affair involving the Europe of Six
(or at moot with the cooperation of Britain),
These variations, however, are less striking than the cleavage
between the pairs of groups. That groups C and D are considerably
less committed to international cooperation, whether through the United
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Nations or the buropean Community, is indicated by their answer to
fairly direct questions. Wen asked whether France can avoid the
choice between the Eastern and Western camps, an average of 51 rot.
spondents in groups A and B felt that France could not avoid such
a choice as compared with an average 35% in groups C and B. Another
question asked whether France could decide her own future alone or
only in cooperation with other peoples. In Groups A and B, an
average 83% believed that cooperation with other peoples was indis-
pensable, whereas only an average of 75% in groups C and D tended
to express attitudes which, if not intensely "nationalistic" in the
traditional sense, showed a far less widespread and less intense
commitment to any of the more compelling forms of modern interna-
tionalism and collective action.
The 1956 Syndrome. Implications For The Future
The 1956 survey thus corrected some widespread, but erroneous,
impressions of the French posture in international life. It demon-
strated that, at least among the French elite, the notorious nationa-
lism of the French was no longer a major obstacle to international
cooperation. Indeed, our survey demonstrated that the French leaders
had moved considerably beyond nationalism in their thinking about
France's place in the world scene. Relatively few believed that France
could go it alone in the contemporary world - i.e., could resolve
the problems of the French future exclusively by national means. A
great majority believed that France will be able to solve its problem
only in cooperation with other nations. Internationalism thus was
perceived as necessary and, again by a very substantial majority,
as desirable,
Having come this far toget er, however, the French elite di.-
vided at this point. The question of the United Nations divided
our respondents into two substantial and approximately equal groups,
About half of the panel believed that the United Nations would play
a "very important role" in the future of world politics. The other
half believed that the United Nations would be of "little use" in
solving the main problems of the future. We have seen that this di-
vision corresponds to divergent expectations of the future between
the two groups. The yea-sayers foresee a world without war, a world
of coexistence - a world in which it is reasonable to put top priority
on political institutions that will build an ever-expanding world cam-
munity. The nay-sayers foresee a world in which continuing cold war
will erupt into a third world war within their lifetime - a world
in which it is reasonable to put top priority on military and economic
institutions designed to strengthen the European Community for survival
in the stormy years that lie ahead,
These two divergent images of the future clearly entailed pro.
found differences in the interpretation of current events and the
evaluation of current institutions. The United Nations played a crucial
role in differentiating these groups -- on no other question did the
panel divide so deeply into two halves. a baffling concomitant of this
diviaion, however, was that the line of cleavage on the United Nations
did not correspond to the line of cleavage on "internationalism" as a
political attitude. The substantial group that took a dim view of
United Nations, the nay-sayers, did not turn out to be anti-internationalists.
Indeed, they were not even deeply hostile to the United Nations. The
quality of their attitude was marked rather by "cool indifference".
They were indifferent, because they considered the United Nations of
relatively little importance on the problems that concerned them.
They were cool, probably, because they regarded the confidence of
their countrymen misplaced. Strong support for the United Nations, in
their view, tended to drain valuable political emotion from the issues
and institutiont they considered more important. As a result, there
appeared the .nverse relationship, whereby those more favorable to
the United Kations were considerably less favorable to European insti-
tutions; zhose more favorable to the European Community were considerably
less fa'orable toward the United Nations. This appeared to be the
specli'cally French tension point on questions of international policy
in L956.
This interpretation of the 1956 syndrome in turn raised questions
that the 1956 survey could not answer. One basic question concerned
the stability of the 1956 syndrome among the French: Was this inverse
relationship between approval of the European Community and of the
United Nations likely to be a permanent, or at least persistent, com-
ponent of political judgment among the French elite? A second basic
question concerned the inner mechanisms of this "cool indifference"
toward the United Nations: On what interpretation of the structure
and function of the United Nations did the nay-sayers reach the con-
clusion that this institution was of little importance and indeed
likely to hinder the development of the European Community which they
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- preferred? For a better understanding of the answers to these
questions, we returned to France for a supplementary survey in the
spring of 1959.
The Situation in 19
Several months after our survey was completed, in the autumn
of 1956, the Sues incident erupted. France and Britain launched
a combined military operation against Suez, with apparent design
of occupying the port and regaining control over the Canal. Simul.
taneously, Israel launched a ground attack which rapidly carried
its army across the Sinai Peninsula. While the precise Israeli ob-
jective and the degree of its coordination with French and British
operations has never been officially clarified, there was no doubt
about the joint military action of the two European powers. The
United States disavowed the operation, as did the United Nations.
The operation was a failure, in that it accomplished no military
purpose or policy objective. It brought widespread censure upon
both France and Britain, largely through the forum provided by the
General Assembly of the United Nations. The aftermath of Suez
seemed likely to irritate many Frenchmen, and convert their "cool
indifference" into quite explicit hostility toward the United Nations,.
The events of the following year seemed further calculated to
intensify French bostility toward the United Nations, Throughout
1957, AkLgeria remained the burning e er rrwei ubri polihr
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It remained also, a recurrent item on the agenda of the United
Nations. While no overt action was taken against France .- since
Algeria was officially regarded as an "internal problem" discussion
in the General Assembly provided opportunities for Arab and other
antagonists of French policy. The United Nations thus served as a
constant irritant among Frenchmen.
By the spring of 1959, with Algeria in a state of crisis the
French parliamentary system seemed incapable of solving, General
DeGaulle returned to power, The Fourth Republic was declared de-
funct, and the Fifth Republic was created. new period opened for
French international policy, employing the language of "grandeur".
Among its elements was a reconsideration of French commitments to
international organizations at all levels., There was a studied in-
difference, generally interpreted to bespeak a deep hostility,
toward the United Nations.
The events of these three years seemed likely to have produced
important changes in French attitudes toward collective international
action as expressed in 1956. To determine their scope and depth, we
returned in the spring of 1959 for a final survey among the elites
of France, Britain and Germany. In each country, we reinterviewed
100 persons from our established panels*. We repeated a substantial
* The German panel actually included 200 newly-selected respondents
treated here as equivalent to 100 old respondents. As this report
rakes no statements requiring a test of "statistical significance",
we do not require a technical account of our procedures.
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number of earlier questions, to see which attitudes had remained
constant and which had changed. Several sets of new questions were
introduced, to test reactions toward the intervening events and
their impact on more general attitudes toward international problems
and policies.
Orientation to United Nations
To map the new distribution of international attitudes in 19590
we asked the following two questions: "Which type of international
community do you consider the most effective in this century? which
do you consider the most desirable?" The options given our respon-
dents included the European, atlantic, United Nations, and World
Communities. Only 18 British and 26 German respondents designated
the United Nations as "most effective". A somewhat larger fraction
in both countries regarded the United Nations as "most desirable"
26 in Britain and 36 in Germany. This level of explicit advocacy
of the United Nations was considerably lower, especially in Britain,
than it had been in 1956. The most striking result was, however,
that not a single Ffench respondent designated the United Nations
as both the most desirable and most effective form of international
community.*
While the 1959 numbers cannot be direetly compared with those
in 1956, owing to the change in question wording, we can compare tre
relative size of the group withholding epdprsement of the United
*Througha techncal error in reproducing our interview form, the Unije>
Nations option was inadvertently omitted from the schedule. Is
that a number of early interviews, recorded before this error was detected
may have included some choices of the United Nati ons as either most - ffee
tive or most desirable. However, it is likely that the number of Yrance
respondents choosing this option, if any, must have been very smat.
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Nations in both years. These respondents are not to be labeled as
"anti-United Nations", hey have in common, rather, that they con-
sider other forms of collective international action as more effec-
tive, more desirable, or both. Their attitudes may range from diffi-
dance to hostility, with their general orientation best described
as "cool indifference". In this sense we note an increase in all
three countries of cool indifference toward the United Nations: in
Germany from 27% to 31%; in Britain from 11% to 30%; in France from
43% to 65%. It is safe to conclude that advocacy of the United
Nations thus decreased in all three European countries, and most
markedly in France.
If the United Nations had been effectively downgraded by French
leaders, what difference did this make in their attitudes on other
international issues? In what measure was their greater diffidence
a reflex to recent events, notably at Sues and Algeria? In what di-
rection was their international posture likely to be altered? To see
what differences were associated with general orientation toward the
United Nations, we classified as "pro-Un" the 35 respondents who con-
sidered United Nations the most desirable form of international co-
operation and as "con-UN" the other 65 respondents. We compared
these groups on Sues and Algeria, the most acute foci of political
controversy involving the United Nations between 1956 and 1959,
SUEZ and AEGEIA
The role of Sues in the post-1956 downgrading of the United
Nations is clarified by comparing the 1959 responses in Britain anCL
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France, the two nations most directly affected. Our first question
posed the issue directly: "Would you say that Britain (France) was
an aggressor at Sues?" The responses distributed as follows:




Don t know ) 9
The British clearly are more willing to say explicitly that Britain
was an gressor at Suez, considerably less willing to deny aggression,
and less inclined to avoid the question by saying "don't know". The
magnitude of this attitudinal divergence is shown by the difference
between the two poles in each country. In Britain the difference
is 20%, with the majority affirming aggression; in France the differ-
ence is only 5%, with the majori.ty denying aggression.
How did this picture look in Britain, %hen the panel was divided
according to contrasting attitudes toward the United Nations? One
would expect the strong advocates of United Nations to be most in-
clined to affirm British aggression at Sues, those cool to the United
Nations to be most inclined to deny British aggression. The result
obtained by cross-tabulation confirmed this expectation in unmistakably
significant fashion:
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Table 10. Sues and the UN in Britain
Pro-UN Con-UN
Yes Aggresion 77 30
No Aggression 20 63
Don't know 3 7
Only 1 out of 5 pro-UN respondents denied British aggression at Sues,
whereas 3 out of 5 con-UN respondents did so. Conversely, 2 out of
every 3 British respondents diffident about the United Nations ex-
plicitly denied British aggression at Suez.
A different relationship between UN-orientation and Sues judgement
was exhibited by the French respondents. Since fewer of them advo-
cated the United Nations, and even fewer acknowledged French aggression
at Sues, the association between these two responses was bound to be
less clear-cut than in Britain. In fact, there turned out to be no
significant relationship at all. The con-UN groups did deny Sues ag-
gression by a slight margin (7%), but the pro-UN group split exactly
in half (46 % on each side).
The foregoing indicates that there is a marked difference, as
between Britain and France, in the impact which pro-UN orientation
exerts Opon attitudes toward other political issues, In Britain,
while strong UN advocacy has diminished somewhat, there remains a
fairly widespread favorable orientation. Moreover, this orientation
is taken seriously. British pro-UN respondents judge other issues
in a manner more consonant with the axioms of traditional "inter-
nationalism". They are more disposed to affirm that their own nation's
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action at Sues was aggression, whereas those diffident about the
United Nations are consistently le disposed to do so.
The situation is quite different in France. There esteem for
the United Nations, never very high, has diminished considerably.
Furthermore, favorable orientation toward the United Nations does
not anpear to modify other French attitudes nearly so consistently
as it does in Britain, Fewer French than British respondents are
prepared to acknowledge that their country committed aggression
at Sues. Further, the UN-orientation (pro or con) seems to make
less difference among French than among British respondents on this
issue.
The point is rather dramatically illustrated when we take account
of French attitudes toward the algerian issue. When we asked "Do
you think the maintenance of French sovereignty in algeria is in-
dispensable for France?", 59 respondents said yes as compared with
29 whosaid no (the remaining 12 saying "don't know"), a clear majo-
rity thus considers French sovereignty in algeria indispensable,
but it is noteworthy that a substantial minority (nearly 1 out of 3
respondents) does not. If favorable orientation toward United Nations
influences their thinking on colonial issues, one would expect this
group of pro-algeria Frenchmen to be virtually identical with the
pro-UN group (also about one-third). This, however, is decidedly not
the case.. again the pro-UN respondents divide exactly -- 43% each
pro and con on the question of iFrench sovereignty in algeria.
To obtain a clearer view of the relationship between attitudes
on Sues, Algeria, and the United Nations, we worked out a table which
expresses these attitudes simultaneously. In one group we put all
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respondents who expressed a consistently. 'internationalist" attitude
affirming that French action at Suez was a -gression and denying
that French sovereignty in Algeria is indispensable, In the other
group we placed the consistently "nationalist" respondents
those declaring Sues non-aggressive and French sovereignty in Algeria
indispensable. We then cross-tabulated these two groups by
orientation toward United Nations, One would expect pro-UN respond.
ents to dominate the "internationalist" group and %ice versa. The
results actually obtained, as shown in Table 11, were quite different:
Table 11. Sune algeria, and the UN in France
Pro-UN Con-UN
Suez-Algeria "Internationalist" 29% 18%
Suez-Agria "Nationaliat" 29 42
While the pro-UN group is more "internationalist" and the
con-UN group is more %ationalist", these horisontal differences are
considerably less striking that the vertical differences. The
greatest magnitude of difference is within the con-UN column
Those diffident toward the United Nations clearly do not express
internationalist judgments of Sues and Algeria, In the pro-UN
column, however, there is no divergence at all, Being generally
well disposed toward the United Nations appears to make ao diff-
erence whatsoever in the judgment of French respondents on Sues and
Algeria. If orientation toward the UN makes no difference on these
issues, we are then inclined to ask on what issues can it matter
at all?
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The Crucial Issu: Collective Security
To answer this question, we reviewed an array of responses
given on all questions involving the United Nations. Our aim was
to locate the attitudinal areas in which pro-UN and anti-UN groups
differed most,
One such question asked: "In what way has the United Nations
been most useful in the past 10 years?" All responses were grouped
under the categories: international forum, preventing war, promoting
peace. Few respondents in any country (only 7 in France) considered
the UN to have been most useful in "promoting peace". In every
country, a substantial proportion considered the UN most useful as
an "international forum". The real line of division within each
country came on the evaluation of the UN role in "preventing war",
In France, the pro-UN and con-UN groups divided as follows:
Table 12. Defining the UN Role
Pro-1N Con-UN
International Forum 37 36%
Preventing lar 31 18
There is virtually no difference between the two groups on the utility
of the UN as an international forum. There is a substantial difference,
however, in evaluating the UN role in oreventing war. The pro-UN
group is considerably more inclined to assign the UN high utility in
this role than the con-UN group. This is an important indication
that the con-UN respondents are not actively hostile owing to some
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ideological animus. Rather, their cool indifference seems based on
the judgment that UN activity has not been useful on the issues that
they consider most important. In short, they consider "preventing
war" a major function and the IN does not meet their test of per-
formance on this function.
This interpretation is confirmed by a second question, which
asked: "In the past 10 years, the spread of local conflicts has been
prevented in several instances. How would you rate the importance
for this of the following factors: United Nations, NATO., American
policy, Soviet policy, Western H-bomb, mutual fear?" Respondents
were asked to rate each of these factors as major, important, or
minor in preventing the spread of local conflicts. In every country,
mutual fear received by far the largest number of ratings as major.
The number of respondents rating UN as a major factor varied sharply
between countries: 25% in Britain, 20% in Germany, as compared with
only 10% in France,
When the French response on these two factors is differentiated
between pro-UN and con-UN groups, the result is as follws:
Table 13. Major Factors in Preventing War
Pro-UN Con-UN
Mutual Fear 83% 82%
UN5 34
Again, there is virtually no difference between the two groups in
assigning a major role to mutual fear. There is, however, considerable
difference in their evaluation of the UN.
That the pro-UN group considers the United Nations important
in preventing war, while the con-UN group judges it to be relatively
ineffectual in this field, is associated with their sharp divergence
on most issues related to collective security, a subsequent question
asked: "Would you approve the integration of the French armed forces
into a permanent international army - under European, Na2O, or UN
command?" The French panel as a whole expressed the least approval
of a UN command (30% as compared with 51% in Germany and 57% in Britain),
The French panel alone expressed disapproval of a UN command by an
absolute majority.
When differentiated into the two subgroups, the French responses
distributed as follows:




Among the con-UN group, there is not much doubt: by a clear 3 to 1
vote they reject the idea of UN command. The pro-UN group is much
less consistent. AL substantial proportion of this group (1 out of 3)
opposes a UN command although its general orientation is favorable
towards the UN. On security issues, their position as a group is
ambiguous and lacking in definition. The con-UN group's low estimate
of UN in matters of collective security shapes their general orientation
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toward UN, because they assign greater importance to the security
range of issues than does the pro-UN groupQ
Another set of questions in our interviews shows that the con-
sistent pattern of differences between the two groups on security
issues is based on divergent expectations of the political future.
The con-UN group is more prepared to believe that this century will
see a third world war (14% as compared with 3% pro-UN), Even more
strongly, the con-UN respondents believe that the last few years,
since Khrushchev, have been cold war rather than coexistence (77%
as compared with 48% pro-UN) and that the cold war will continue
for the years ahead (49% as compared with 26% pro-UN). Nor, in
the continuing years of cold war ahead, do they foresee bright pros-
pects for international disarmament. When asked whether they
believed that a general disarmament agreement covering both conven-
tional and nuclear weapons would be reached in the next few years,
52% con-UN said no as compared with 31% pro-UN.
As a consequence of these expectations, the con-ON group are
obviously obliged to assign a higher level of importance to issues
of collective security. When asked "In military matters, would
you give top priority to deterrence or disarmament?", the two groups
divided as follows:





Their greater concern with deterrence leads the con-UN group to
significantly stronger advocacy of a modern weapons-system for France.
A subsequent question asked; "Do you favor the manufacture of thermo-
nuclear arms by France of ballistic weapons?" The proportion saying
yes to both these questions distributed as follows:
Table 16. French Weapons
Pro-UN Con-UK
Yes, Thermonuclear 4o 56%
Yes, Dolistic 51 71
a very striking feature of the con-UN grouph concern with
se.srijtyisat it, reposes neither on traditional nationalism
nor on the current language of grandeur, On the contrary, the
con-JN group appears to be much more widely convinced that the days
of national glory, independent of collective international action,
are gone for France. One of our questions asked: "Do you think
that in the next few years France will take a more independent
position between Eastern and Western camps?" Nearly half of the
con-UN group (49%) said no as comipared with 28% pro- UN. We then
asked: "Should France do so?" Again the con-UN group showed a
stronger committment to collective action: 48% said no as compared
with 26%of the pro-UN group.
This belief that France will not and should not seek a more
independent position anpears to be associated with their conviction
that collective security is the top priority issue of French policy
today. As a group who foresee the possibility of a third world war,
continuation of cold war, improbability of general disarmament,
these respondents are diffident about the United Nations mainly
because it does not satisfy their concern with collective security.
They are not anti-internationalist, nor even systematically hostile
toward the UN. ihey care less about the UN because they care more
about those issues on which the UN seems to them least effectual.
Accordingly, while ooposed to UN command over an international
army, they give stronger support to NA0L and especially European
commands. This is shown when the proportions approving the three
types of command are compared:
Table 17 UN, NATO, Ekuropean Commands
Pro-UN Con-UN
Approve UN Command 49% 20%
Aorove NATO Command 46
Aove Europan Command 31 48
This is an important indication of the direction in which
colective security has been taking many French leaders over recent
years. In 1956, it was already clear that security issues were the
main divisive force within the French elite. Those less concerned
with security tended to favor the United Nations, with its
o')ortunities for reaching international agreements by political
discussion and legal. uegotiations Those iore intensely concerned
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with security issues were correspondingly diffident about the
United Nations. Their orientation was rather toward the European
and Atlantic communities, with institutions more specifically
designed to maintain and augment national power through collective
military and economic action. By 1959, this line of cleavage had
grown even wider, as shown by the data bearing on the Atlantic and
European comxmunities.
The Atlantic Communi
The institutional exnression of the Atlantic Community is NaTO.
Th Atlantic Comnunity is not wholly without a rystigos since the
dramatic wartime proclamation of the atlantic Charter by Churchill
and Roosevelt. The qystique, however, has not widened its original
meaning as an Anglo-American affirmation of solidarity with Western
Europe. Hence, the Atlantic concept has never carried much
resonance to those segments of the British Commonwealth that are
remote from the Atlantic basin, Also among the French, possibly
because they were not represented in the original declaration, the
At lantic concept has remained a military institution rather than a
political gtique. Despite much discussion about the expansion of
its non-military functions through Article 2, the atlantic Community
has continued to mean NATO and little more,
It is only in this narrow military sense that the Atlantic
Community is supported among French leaders. It is understandable
therefore, that support for NaTO Is consistently more widespread
among the con-UN than pro-UN group. Every question in our interview
which gave respondents an oipor-tunity to evaluate the importance of
NATO showed this pattern.
An example is the question concerning the prevention of the
soread of localized conflicts over the past 10 years. Respondents
were asked whether each of six factors had played a major or
minor role in this process. as a matter of historical fact, Na1O
had not been directly involved in preventing the spread of any
local conflict during the past decade. Nevertheless, in ranking
the six factors, 23% of the con-U group ranked the NaTO role as
"major", whereas only 17% of the pro-UN group did so.
Another examole illustrates the relationship between N&TO and
the European organisations, As we shall see, the con-UN groups
give consistently more support to all the institutions of Eurooe,
particularly the little Europe of Six;. Nevertheless, when asked
which existing European organization was more valuable for France
than NAO, 31% of the con-UN group (as compared with 23% pro I)
said that no European organization was more important, In addition,
34% of the con-UN group responded that theEuropean and NATO
organizations were "not comparable". We interpret this to mean
that they advocate both types of institutions and refuse to choose
between them, This is more noteworthy by tontrast with their
willingness to choose between European-Atlantic institutions and
UN institutions, to the disadvantage of the latter.' Their relative
willingness to downgrade the UN, indeed, gives the con-UN group its
defining characteristic,
A final examp2p concerns the historic problem of Germany, The
French vanel was asked: "Is it better to keep West Germany in NaTO
as now, or to see Germany re-unified outside NaTO?" This is a
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dramatic issue which has played a major role in French policy over
the past decade. All the more striking, then, is the clear
divergence on this question between the two groups of respondents,
Keeping West Germany inside of NA70 was endorsed by 57% of the
pro-UN group, but by a resounding 77% of the con-UN group,
There are several dimennions ivrolved here, each capable of
being stressed independentjy. Our interpretation would stress the
inter-relatedness of this sequence of judgments among the con-UN
French leaders* that the NATO institution, which brings Anglo-
American military support, is essential to the security and growth
of continental Europe; that the security and growth of continental
Europe are essential to France's position in the world; that neither
contipental nor NATO power can be maintained efficiently without the
participation of West Germany; that the participation of West Germany
in both European and NaTO institutions must therefore be endorsed by
all right-thinking Frenchmen.
This is a terse summary of a fairly complex chain of political
reasoning. To elaborate its components, we must comprehend French
thinking about the European Community as the chosen instrument of
ontinental security, and growth, and thereby as the guarantee of
France's place in the world,
The European Communit
French approval of the European institutions rose consistently
from 1956 to 1959. This approval was expressed with reference to
the European principle of collective action and to the particular
European institutions actually in operation. Moreover, while approval
rose across the board, it rose rather more sharply toward some insti-
tutions than others. Both of these findings are exhibited in Table 18:
Table 18. Risig of Euro an Institutions
1956 1959
Common Market (EEC) 73%* 855
Coal-Steel Comunity (ECSC) 74 79
Euratom 70** 78.
OEEC 73 71
Council of Europe 62 66
The largest increases were registered for Euratom (8$) and for the
Common Market (12%). It is noteworthy that these institutions did
not even exist in 1956, As indicated above, our 1956 questions re-
lated to proposals then under discussion which ultimately led to the
creation of Euratom and the Common Market. It was the creation of
these two institutions, notably the Common Market, that gave the
European movement its great impetus during the intervening years.
This is evidenced by a set of questions in which the strong Europeans
consistently favor the Common Market and Euratom over other forms
of European organization and over all other forms of collective action
as well. This set of questions also indicates why these strong
* In 1956: "Do you think the principle of the Coal-Steel Community
can be extended to other sectors?", (ie, leading toward a Common Market?)
* In 1956: "Should the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy
be left to an international authority?" (ie., leading toward Euratom?)
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Europeans are con-UN, whereas the pro-UN respondents tend to be less
strongly European.
A measure of the general intensity of European conviation was
given by the question: "Do you thnk that French participation in
the European institutions diminishes or augments France's position
in the world?" A resounding 89% of the con-UN group said "augments",
as compared with the 72% pro-UN; 11% of the latter said "dminishes"
as compared with 3% con-UN. Differences of this magnitude appeared
rather consistently on questions involving intensity of commitment
to European institutions. Mluch later in our interview, we asked:
"Do you think that France's obligations within the new French-African
Community hinder the fulfiament of its role within its European
Community?" Only 18% conrUN said "yes" as compared with 29% pro-UN;
conversely, 77% con-UN said "no" as compared with 63% pro-UN. (It
is noteworthy in this connection that the con-UN group are considerably
more committed to the French-African Community: 66% of them consider
it "basic for the position of France in the world" as compared with
51% pro-UN).
A similar divergence anpeared in comparative judgments of the
European institutions. When asked to designate "the most valuable"
of these institutions, 46% con-UN chose the Common Market as compared
with 37% pro-UN. We then asked two questions designed to locate
respondents in the controversy between the Inner Six and Outer Seven,
which was just getting tunder way in the spring of 1959. The first
question asked: "Do you think that the Common Market as now consti-
tuted will work well in the long run?" Optimism was expressed by
79% con-UN as compared with 66% pro-UN respondents. We then asked:
"Do you think its extension into a Free Trade Area with Britain and
other countries is desirable?" Here the pro-UN group was much more
ready (69% as compared with 52% con-UN) to expand the Common Market
into the Free Trade Area. The more strongly European con-UN group,
who considered that expansion into a Free Trade Area would strip the
Common Market of its real powers, were much less inclined to sacri-
fice continental controls in order to avoid controversy with the
British.
This does not mean that the con-UN group was anti-British. It
means, rather, that they were more strongly committed to the Erope
of Six as a major organizing principle for collective action. This
view they expressed quite consistently, When asked whether they had
favored EDC at the time it was proposed, 63% con-UN said "yes" as
compared with 48% pro-UN. Yet this attitude does not imply either
an anti-British or an anti-NATD sentiment. On the contrary, when
asked which European organization they considered more important than
N&TO, considerably more of the con-UN group, despite their stronger
support for Europe, said that no European organization was more im-
portant than NATO. Similarly, as we have seen, the con-UN group
gave far stronger support (77% as compared with 57% pro-UN) to keeping
West Germany within NATO rather than a re-unified Germany outside
of NAT.
The foregoing presents an apparently paradoxical array of atti-
tudes toward internationalism among French leaders, It appears that
one type of respondent is more internationalist on some issues, less
internationalist on others. It appears also one type of internationa-
list differs quite radically (and consistently) from the other, What
is clear, finally, is that our traditional conception of an "inter-
nationalist" no longer operates as a descriptive category. The
ideological character of political beliefs is no longer so marked in
France as it once was. An "internationalist" can now choose between
a variety of ways of organizing collective international action.
Some prefer the image of a peaceful world in which all nations are
subordinated to a common rule of law; accordingly, they become strong
supporters of the United Nations. Others prefer forms of collective
action that contribute more directly to regional economic growth and
military security; these consider the United Nations relatively un-
important as compared with the European and Atlantic Communities.
Both consider themselves internationalists.
Indeed, a major finding emerging from these data is that France
has passed beyond nationalism. This is to say, in effect, that the
French elite is passing beyond ideology. The process of reshaping
traditional ideologies has gone quite far in a few years. Loyalties
to old ideological conventions have been breaking down. What now
matters is one's imagery of the current world scene, the place of
France on this stage, and "realistic" rather than ideological expec-
tations about future events (i.e, estimates rather than wishes).
The passing of inherited ideological schisms has brought into French
political thinking a new line of cleavage based on probabilistic
imagery and pragmatic expectations. This has reshaped the area of
political emotion, in which explanations of current cleavages now lie,
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so that observation framed by traditional perspectives can easily
go awry. Iat us consider explicitly the shift in political optics
that has occurred in France.
France, The West,. and The Future
The passing of ideology is, for the student of political
psychology, the major hypothesis emerging from our data. It is no
longer easy for Frenchmen, even at the extremely high level of
leadership which constitutes our panel, to differentiate themselves
along traditional lines of ideological commitment. One question in
our interviews asked French respondents how they would identify their
own attitude toward current events -- giving them a choice of nationa-
list, internationalist, supranationalist. Perhaps the most striking
single result in our survey, in terms of the psychology of political
attitudes, is that our respondents were virtually identical in the
distribution of their answers to this question:





There is virtually no variation between the pro-UN and con.-UN
groups. The plain inference is that the United Nations does not matter
very much to Frenchmen. Whether one is positive or negative regarding
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the United Nations does not change one I8 view of oneself as a poli-
tical creature. Wat does divide French leaders is their attitude
towards security. Despite their equivalence (i.e., indifference?)
with respect to internationalism, they divided sharply when we asked:
"In terms of military strategy, would you give top priority to dis-
armament or deterrence?" Here, as we reported earlier in Table 15,





The security issue has become paramount for French leadership.
Along this line they divide quite clearly with respect to mary speci-
fic problems, as we have seen, The key variable here is not politi-
cal ideology but security imagery. As the traditional conventions
of ideological commitment became increasingly incongruent with the
contemporary lines of world politics, French leaders went through
the extremely difficult task of revising their imagery of France in
the world. The stimulus was security; the response was politics.
Political imagery begins with the political self. The political
self is the nation. A coherent image is one in which expectations
about the future of the nation, and its role among the nations of the
world, is consistent. This part of our story begins with the diffe-
rential expectation, as between our pro-UN and con-UN groups, regarding
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the prospects of France in the world. We asked: "Would you say that
the present position of France regarding the future is rather good
or rather bad?" The responses were
Table 20. France's General Position
Pro-UN Con-UN
Rather Good 83% 92%
Rather Bad 17 5
The con-UN Frenchmen are clearly more optimistic about the prospects
of their country than the pro-UK group. This contrast of expectations
remained constant when French respondents were asked whether "a
rising standard of living can be maintained over the long run" in
various areas of the world. The distribution of responses was as
follows:
Table 21. Rising Standard of Ivin
Pro-UN Con-UN
In Soviet Union 91% 74%
In China 83 74
In Underdeveloped Areas 80 42
In France 77 83
It is striking that the pro-UN group were consistently more opti-
mistic about Russia, China and the underdeveloped areas than they
were about France. Equally striking is the evidence that the con-UN
group, while substantially more skeptical that these areas will
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continue to prosper, were rather more optimistic that France itself
will maintain a rising standard of living.
This is a fairly basic expectation. Wat one imagines about
the future well-being of nations is often decisive in one's tinking
about how to behave with current issues and prospective problems.
It appears that, in their image of the world political scene, the
con-UN group are less "defeatist" than the pro-UN group. We asked
the French panel: "ich nations would you rank as the five most
powerful in the world today, in order of importance?" This produced
a fairly complicated series of rank caderings among the nations.
The alient points of divergence are given in Table 22:
Table 22. Ranking The Nations Today
Pro-UN Con-UN
US Frs54* 68%*
USSa First 54 52
France Third 6 12
Britain Fourth 37 43
Germany Fourth 11 35
China Third 34 20
On the big, perhaps primary, question whether. america or Russia
is the stronger power, the pro-UN group divided exactly in half.
Just as many of them (54%) believe that the US is first as believe
that the USSR is first. The con-UN group is rather less ambivalent
on this question. Significantly more of them believe that the US is
first (14% horizontally and 16% vertically). Another interesting




difference appears in assigning France third place among the nations.
While both figures are low, reflecting the general epectation that
Franoots national power is and will remain limited, the con-a group
are monsiderabLy aore i nlined to place their bets on the future of
France. This is true also idth a respect to the other European powers,
since the con-IN group consistently rank both Britain and Germany higher
than do the pro.mUN group. By contrast, the pro-1N group eresses
significant27 higher expectations about the power of China: 34% of
thea, as contrasted with 20% of the con-UN group, believe that China
is alrear today the third power in the world.
We followed up this question by asking: "What changes do you
foresee in the ranking of the nations by the end of the centur7?'
The responses to this question are shown in Table 231
Table 23. Ranking the Nations at End of Centar
Pro-UN ConmUN
US first 23% 29%
USSR second 31 14
China first 23 25
China third or higher 52 40
Britain fourth 47 29
France fourth 14 25
Germany fourth 9 25
The table shows onay significant differences in the great variety
of rankings permitted by this question. In the competition for
first place, the coon-UN group continues to give the US a slight
V'
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margin, while the pro-UN group gives a very substantial margin to
the USSR in second place.
Rather more striking is the decline of both the US and USSR
in the imagery of Frenchmen, when contrasted with the dramatic rise
of China to top vower. Even among the con-UN group, a shade more
of respondents believe that China rather than Russia or America
will be the first power in the word, an image held, consistently,
by more of the pro-UN group. The imagery involved here is even
more drawns&e when we combine the estimates that China will be the
third or higher power in ;the world. There is clearly more consensus
among our panel on the rising power of China than on any other
expectation evoked by our questions. Among the con-IUN group 40%
believe that China will be the third of higher power among the
nations of the world. Among the pro-UN group, 52% believe this -
the only occurrence of an absolute majority opinion in the responses
to this question. After the top three nations have been ranked,
the remaining estimates reveal mainly the consistently greater
optimism about the Eurppaan nations among the con-UN group than
among the pro-UN group.
This margin of confidence in the future of Europe is perhaps
the most directly. relevant element in our survey. It may well be
the key to the paradox that the con-UN group are no less "internationalist"
in their own way, than those trenchmen who favor the UN. This
interpretation is suggested by the revponses to our question:
"By the end of this century, do you think the world balance of




Table 24 East-West Balaos, End of Century
Pro-UN Con-UN
Favor the Bast 40% 36%
Favor the West 3 9
Neither Side 26 23
Don't know 31 31
'he smallness of these differences is the most impressive feature
of the table. 'he pro-UN group slightly favor the belief that the
world balance will favor the East; the con-UN group marginally
believe that the world balance will favor the West. The differences
are small, particularly when viewed by the major factor of
uncertaintW which otivates large proportions of respondents in
both groups to say "neither side" and " don't know", Eqcpally
striking is the very widespread belief in both groups that the
world balance of poWr will favor the East.
Yet, this picture changes radically when we move from
expectations to policy preferences, We have already reported this
result, but it is worth repeating in the present context. Our
next quest.on was: Do you think that in the next years France
will take a more independent position between the East and West
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camps? Should France do so?" The responses distributed as follows:
Tabl 25.French Independence lbward East-West
Pro-UN Con-UN
Will not 28% 49%
Should not 26 48
Despite their nearly congruent expectations that the world
balance-of-power would favor the East, the two groups divided
quite sharply on this question uhich asked how Frenchmen should
respond to this expectation. The pro-UN Frenchmen were largely
convinced that France will, and should, take a more independent
position - fairly obviously related to their preference for a
*neutralist" position. The con-.UN Frenchmen, despite their hardly
less bleak exoectation abodt the future, believed that France will
not and should not seek to play an independent role between the two
bipolar camps.
The data already reported indicates that there is, among the
con-UN group, a stronger sense of identification with the Westemn
Community. Quite apart from the rationality of their judgment on
these questions, there is a clear preference among the con-UN group
to believe that "the West", as such, must survive. This group also
prefers to believe that France has a role to play in this survival
by its attitudes and actions.
Our final survey was made in the spring of 1959, when
Europeans were just beginning to realise that the world had passed
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from the air-age through the atomic-age to the space-age. These
e*xcessively rapid transitions have left people in every country of
the world unsettled. In france we asked two qutAions dealing with
these issues: "Do you think the launching of Sputniks. proves' that
Russia is ahead in missile technique? If so, is the lead decisive
or will it be matched?" Such questions, which have perplexed
Americans 4wen more than others, are relatively meaningles except
in terms of imagery. How one answers such questions is based not
on knowledge, but on preference and expectation. Al the more
striking, thn, in view of their consiAtently greater diffidence and
skepticism on other matters, is the substantially greater optimism
of the con-UN group on these issues:
Table 26. Sputniks and the Missile Race-
Pro-UN Con-UN
Sputniks do not prove Russian
suneriority 9% 33%
itussian lead will be matched 68 92
The optimisa of the con-UN group on this point is quite striking.
By morit than three to one they rejected the idehat the Soviet
sputniks prove a lead in missile technique - which is the essential
security question. ' By a very substantial minority, approaching
unanimity, the con-UN group believed that the Russian lead, if any,
is not decisive and will be matched (obviously by the U.S.)
The political consequences of this difference-of-opinion are
very great.' The base from which the difference arises is less clear.
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We face a group of French leaders whose habits of mind are skeptical
and diffident, whose expectations are relatively glum, but who opt
nevertheless for positive action by France Soamhow, they prefer to
believe that French policies may make a difference in the future
shape of the West and the world. In this respect, they stand in
sharp contrast to a large group of French "internationalists" of the
traditional persuasion - who favor the United Nations, but who appear
to have neither confidence that the West can survive nor the will
to stake French policy on Western survival.
What manner of men are differentiated by these two groups?
Ar.s we talking about real people or merely ideal types? Our
understanding of the data presented in this study will be more
vivid if we know what sorts of living Frenchmen are actually represent-
ed in these "pro-UN" and "con-UN" groups about which we have been
reporting
Who are these Frenchmen?
There is a clear and consistent line of cleavage between two
groups of French leaders, starting from their respective imagery of
the world political arena and their judgment on the security issues
which divide the world today. This line of cleavage produces
quite regular differences in expetations about the future shape of
world pover, and in the policy priorities advocatead for dealing
with the salient problems foreseen by the two groups. The pro-UN
067
group foresees the relative decline of Western power, dongrades
the importance of mdlitary problems (since they are less inclined
to foresee a continuing cold war that wil erupt into a third world
war), emphasises the importance of political discussion and dip."
lcmatic negotiation. The con-UN group, on the other hand, is far
more concerned with security issmes - being more inclined to fore-
see continuing cold war that may erupt into a third world war.
They are somewhat more optimistic about the feasibility of main-
tainilig Western strength and give priority to all activities
designed to st rengthen the West. Accordingly, they downgrade
United Nations and other channels of - political and diplomatic
activity; instead, they place a much higher valuation upon the
European and Atlantic institutions designed for collective inter-
national action on military and economic problems.
Once the line of cleavage is clear, however, the question
arises: Viich sorts of Frenchmen compose these two groups? To
the extent that we are talking about real people, one would expect
the pro-UN group to have certain common characteristics that
differentiate them from the con-UN group. To identify such differ-
ences, we reviewed the personal data gathered on all respondents
and compared their distribution between the two groups. Certain
clear differences in their biographical attributes,and indeed
in their psychological attributes, did anpear.
For example, there is a fairly representative age distribution
in both groups, but the pro-UN group clusters more strongly around
younger men: 20% of them are under forty years old, as compared with
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9% of the con-UN group. Again, the panel as a whole is highly
educated. However, the con-UN group includes a higher proportion
of graduates fron the University at Paris: 66% as compared with
54% of the pro-UN group. This educational pattern appears to be
directly related to their occupational distributions




Trade Unions 17 3
Politics 9 23
Civil Service 3 26
The pro-UN group clusters most heavily in business, journalism,
and the trade unions. The con-UN group is represented most heavily
in politics and the higher civil service (les grands corps de l'Etat).
Their professional concern with politics and governmentaWy explaim
why the con-UN grotip consistently shos a "hard-headed" attitude
toward current issues. Conversely, the prevalence of journalism
aide. trade unionism may explain the more "liberal" profile of
attitudes found among the pro-UN group. It is noteworthy, in this
regard, that the Uliberal" perspecttv6. is shared by a substantial
number of French business leaders.
The relationship of these contrasting political perspectives
to po4itical a ffiliation is evident when we compare the distribution
of the two groups among the parties. Since the French parties are
numerous and sousewhat confusing, we havo grouped the distributions
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according to the usual French classifications as left, Center
and Right:






As we might expect, the aro-UN group clusters more heavily
toward the left, the con-ON group more heavily toward the Center.
It is noteworthy that the con-UN group rather more frequently avow
explicitly that they have no political affiliation. This probably
reflects the apolitical character of the hLgher civil service in
France, The substantial minority of pro-UN respondents vho
classified themselves as Center reflect the moderate political
outlook of busineds leaders. The prevailing "liberalism" of the
pro-UN group is reconfirmed 'i their attitude to the traditional
issue of religiono When we asked respondents to state their relig-
ion, 78% of the con.-UN group identified themselves as Catholics as
compared with only 60% of the pro-UN group who did so. As a
correlary, a ufuch higher proportion of the pro-UN group explicitly
disavowed any religios affifliation: 23% as comoared with only
6% of the con-UN group. Secularism (including anticlericalism and
nonaffiliation) is a component of traditional "liberalism"
The fairly clear division along ideological lines -
corresponding to patterned differences of age, education, occupation -
V 0
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becae blurred when we consider differences in attitude towards
foreign countries and peooles. Traditionally, th internationalist
is the man who res,onds more favorably to foreign ideas, thingssand
people thi the nationalist. But we have already seen that, while
the pro-UN respondents can be considered as "internat4onalists",
it is not possible to label the con-UN group as "aonalists
They arejust as favorably inclined toward the world around them,
but they put different priorities for different purposes on their
contacts with the rest of the world. These differe rnes come out
rather clearly in response to a set of questions dealing with
information and travel.
One such question asked respondents to designate the domestic
means of information they considered most useful in keeping informed
about world affairs; they were then auked to designate the most use-
ful means of information. The results distributed as follows:













Among the domestic mans of information, the pro-UN group tend
to prefer radio and t.evision, the con-UN group to prefer books
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and conversation. It may be that the higher civil servants are
perforce more heavily involved with books, and the politicians
more heavily involved with conversation, than would be trwaase
of the business and labor leaders in the pro-UN group. A more
relevant point, however, is that these preferences remain constant
with respect to foreign means of information. Again the pro-UN
group tend to find radio and television most useful, while con-UN
group prefer books and conversation. The contrast is emphasised by
the item of weekly" magasines, which the con-UN group find con-
siderably more useful than the pro-UN group. Supplementary inform-
ation given by the respondets indicates that they are referring
to serious journals of information and opinion, such as the it
the New Statesman, and the leading American weeklies.
A similar et of responses was given to questions concerning
travel We asled, respondents whether they have been abroad last
year, whether they ha ever visled Russia, whether they had ever
visited America. In each case, the con-UN group turned out to be
more triavelled that the pro-UN group:
Table 30. Past Travel
Pro-UN_ Con-UN
Abroad last Year 72% 80%
Ever visited Russia 20 34
Ever visited America 60 75
Not only has the con-UN group done more travelling in the past,
but it has -stronger and more definite preferences for futre
travel. We asked respondents whether they would prefer to visit
Russia or America in the near future. Their answers distributed
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as forllmus





Along Mtese litis, a rather strikdng result mrged when we asked
the respondents: "If you had to live in another country, bich would
ou choose?' Table 32 show the distribution of first choices given
to counbries outside of the EuCrpean ontnents
Table 32. First Choice of Residence Abroad
ProWUN Con-UN
United States 6% 22%
Canada 0 6
South Aerica 0
Clearly the con-UN goup cannot be suspected of manophobic ational-
im hem I out of 3 ( ascompared with I out of 16 pro..N) are ready
to choose an alternate homland outside of Europe. If anything, the
con.-UN people seem to be l.e doesticated and more mnophilio.
It is noteWorty that the pro-UN people, SLAhough consistently
less enthusiastic about European policies, appear to be aore closely
bound to the 03 Continent in their insgination. A projective type
of question a&kMds qihat would you do in a Conmnust France?*
Virtually identical proportions in both groups iagin .that they
vould 'adapt' (I out of 3) or that they would "be harmd" (I out of 5)
The dignificant dfference betmemn the groups appeared among those
respoMents vho imagined themselves in a less passive role and opted
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for a more vigasous course of aStion. Here the g4porteIn choosing
to resist or to aidgrate were precisely reversed between the groups:
Table m. In a Omir st France
Pro.UN Cn-U
would resist atove37 17% 9%
would edigrate 9 17
If the bon-UN people are assin more hardheaded . in thefr
skeptioISm about the utility of active resistance to a aommdat
regime - they are also more flomible about their bonds to the ae-
land. The aw be readier to Imagine changes in the political futue
because they are more secure (or satisfied) in their personal present.
On two interesting projective questions, the con..UN people shoued a
somewhat mre stable attitude toward their present situatin. One
askeds fthich generaon do ou think the best to live in - your
parent~s, your Wa, or that of younger people todqW In the
con-UN group 68% chose their oin generation as compared with 60
pro-UN. The latter, by te same 8 margin, magined life was
(or would be) better in the younger generation. To the question
If you had your life to live over again, what would you change?
48% con-UN replied that they would make no change. as copared with
Z63% pro-UN.
Thoe Franch leaders who are ooolly indifferent to the United
Igtone turn out, then, to be reel people with specific and consistent
differenoes from those French leaders who strengly advocate the UN.
The con-UN people are somewhat older, have more often graduated fram
the University of Paris, cluster more strongly in politics and
goverment as a vocation. They find books and conversation more
7h
useful sources of inforation thana the mass media, both at bome and
abroad. They travel abroad more frequent27 and widely - at least
aignificantly more of then have visited both America and Russia in
the past. Their future travel preferences are mch more definite.
They show a uzch greater inclination - if they bad to live
elsewhere that Frane - to choose a new hnmeaanr overseas (North
or South America). Similarly, they axe unb readier to emigrate If
France should go camunist. Thus, despit 'their stronger advocapy
of European policies, thy are less bound to the European solL in
imagination. We cannot say whether this indiates that they are mre
Smginative individnals in genral, or whether they are simply readier
to face the Iasards of a politital future in which edgration from
Europe might be the most practical course of action.
In the latter case, it is noteuWorthy that they are rather more
seoure in the present. They tend to prefer life in their own gen-
aration over the past or future (whereas pro-UN people incline
rather more toward the futre generation). If they had their lives
to live over again, fewer of them would make any significant changes,
Their attitudes towards child-raising are also consonant with their
greater readiness to face a hasardous future - and to enlorse policies
that will either pefvent dangers or inimiase their harmful effects.
In a separate study of responses to the question "Should one praise
a good child before others?" we noted that 62% pro-UN people said
yes as co ared with 42% con-UN. Yet, as further analyis ad clear,
the con-UN people iere not necessariy more disciplinarian, nor even
more sevwre, in their attitudes toward children. They seemed, rather,
ore oeitted to a principle of "guided democracy" in child-raising
- i..., that children should be taught to face the risks of reality,
and theetg to frestaU dangoa'u and muinoe 120me0osaary losses.
we percive then, that attitudes toard the UN differentate
two rather clear sorts of real Frmnhmen. Their attitudes differ
mm SatmAt3qy On the present and the future, polities and policies,
+.he~es and their children. In perceiving these lines of
cleavage, we gain a deeper appreciation of ihat the Uitd Nation
*Wns to contpary French leaders.
